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International Law in the Obama 
Administration’s Pivot to Asia: 
The China Seas Disputes, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Rivalry with the PRC, and 
Status Quo Legal Norms in U.S. 
Foreign Policy 
Jacques deLisle 
The Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalance” to 
Asia has shaped the Obama administration’s impact on 
international law. The pivot or rebalance has been primarily 
about regional security in East Asia (principally, the challenges 
of coping with a rising and more assertive China—particularly 
in the context of disputes over the South China Sea—and 
resulting concerns among regional states), and secondarily about 
U.S. economic relations with the region (including, as a 
centerpiece, the Trans-Pacific Partnership). In both areas, the 
Obama administration has made international law more 
significant as an element of U.S. foreign policy and has sought 
to present the U.S. as defending and promoting status quo 
international legal norms, largely against challenges posed by 
China. This approach has been somewhat more plausible on 
security / South China Sea issues than on economic / TPP 
issues. At the end of the Obama administration, significant 
uncertainty looms about the prospects for this aspect of the 
Obama-era approach international law and the international and 
domestic conditions that helped to produce it. 
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The Obama administration framed its “pivot” or “rebalance” to 
Asia primarily in terms of geopolitics and foreign policy. Yet, the 
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policy also has had significant international legal elements and 
implications. The promise to rebalance the U.S.’s efforts and attention 
toward Asia—implicitly, toward East Asia—may have fallen short of 
expectations,1 but the pivot did push East Asia-related questions 
much more toward the center of the U.S.’s practice of, and approach 
to, international law. The Obama administration’s response to 
disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the South 
China Sea (and the East China Sea), and its quest for the Trans-
Pacific Partnership as a “twenty-first century” trade agreement (and 
a pact that reaches well beyond trade in regulating an increasingly 
global economy) are primary legal aspects of the pivot or rebalance.  
The U.S.’s “pivot” or “rebalance” toward East Asia (including 
Southeast Asia) was also a shift away from a focus on another 
geographic area: the Middle East (or West Asia, including Iraq) and 
South Asia (more specifically, South-Central or Southwest Asia, 
including Afghanistan and Pakistan). As is often the case, these 
different parts of the world have presented different political and, in 
turn, legal challenges for the United States. Thus, the pivot also 
meant a shift in the subject matter focus of the U.S.’s practice and 
agenda in international law. During the George W. Bush 
administration, the defining issues in international law for the United 
States centered on the fall-out of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan: the rights and obligations of states in combatting 
terrorist organizations, the use of military force—with and without 
UN Security Council authorization—to intervene in states that were 
 
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL GREEN ET AL., ASIA-PACIFIC REBALANCE 12025: 
CAPABILITIES, PRESENCE, AND PARTNERSHIPS 195 (2016), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance20
25_Web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3HN-52QG] (finding “consistent 
confusion about the rebalance strategy and concerns about its 
implementation” among U.S. government agencies and U.S. allies and 
partners in East Asia); Joshua Keating, Did the Obama Administration 
Ever Actually Pivot to Asia?, SLATE BLOG (Apr. 21, 2014, 5:52 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/04/21/obama_s_asia_t
rip_did_the_administration_ever_actually_pivot_to_asia.html 
[https://perma.cc/ND94-8RPG] (stating that, “despite all the talk of its 
growing strategic importance, East Asia rarely seems to be the center of 
attention in Washington”); Joshua Kurlantzick, Pivotal Moment, 
DEMOCRACY (2016), available at 
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/39/pivotal-moment/ 
[https://perma.cc/SXD3-RGMR] (describing the pivot as “badly 
misguided” in focusing on states with little strategic value and 
facilitating political regression in the region); Fareed Zakaria, Whatever 
Happened to Obama’s Pivot to Asia?, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-forgotten-pivot-to-
asia/2015/04/16/529cc5b8-e477-11e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/237X-UEAT] (opining that, “[t]he Obama 
administration needs to start believing in its own grand strategy…. 
Washington should focus its energies, attention and efforts on Asia”). 
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found to support terrorism or harbor terrorists, the rules governing 
treatment of combatants who were not members of the conventional 
armed forces of states, targeted killings of individuals identified as 
terrorists, the resort to “enhanced interrogation” or torture, and the 
imposition of limits on civil liberties—some of which overlap 
international human rights—under the proffered justification of 
preventing terrorist acts and disrupting terrorist organizations.2   
To be sure, many of these issues persisted into the Obama 
presidency, and the Bush administration’s interactions with 
international law were not confined to military intervention- and 
terrorism-related issues. Although the contrast between the two 
administrations, therefore, should not be overdrawn, the pivot-related 
shift in the principal geographic and doctrinal concerns for the U.S. in 
international law is striking. The two most high-profile legal 
dimensions of the turn to (East) Asia under Obama have had 
significant similarities and served interdependent policy goals. The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) constitutes much of the economic 
leg of the mostly security-focused pivot.3 The strategic pivot—
including especially the elements focused on the South and East 
China Seas—undertakes to provide the security underpinnings for 
open trade and economic ties in the region and beyond.   
In both contexts—the TPP and related issues of international 
economic law, and the China Seas disputes and associated issues of 
maritime zones, sovereignty, and security-related international law—
the U.S. cast itself as the defender of status quo international legal 
norms in the face of Chinese positions that have pressed or may 
portend a revisionist agenda. The U.S.’s stances on both sets of legal 
issues have been entwined with efforts to assure and engage other 
regional states and to advance U.S. interests and aims. But the two 
issue areas also differed in significant ways, including the clarity and 
robustness of the legal status quo that the U.S. has purported to 
defend, and the responses to U.S. moves by regional states living in 
the shadow of frictions, and possibly sharpening rivalry, between the 
U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
 
2. See generally Marco Sassoli, The International Legal Framework for 
Fighting Terrorists According to the Bush and Obama Administrations: 
Same or Different, Corrector Incorrect?, 104 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 
277 (2011); Michael Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force 
in International Law, 79 INT’L L. STUD. 8 (2003) (discussing the Global 
War on Terrorism and the use of force). 
3. See generally, KURT CAMPBELL & BRIAN ANDREWS, EXPLAINING THE US 
‘PIVOT’ TO ASIA 3-5 (2013) (describing the TPP, strengthening existing 
alliances in the region, and improving relations with emerging regional 
powers as the three priorities of the pivot); MARK E. MANYIN ET AL., 
PIVOT TO THE PACIFIC? THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S REBALANCING 
TOWARD ASIA 20 (2012) (“Economics and trade are both causes of and 
instruments for the pivot toward the Asia-Pacific.”). 
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I. The China Seas Disputes—Territorial Sovereignty, 
Maritime Jurisdiction, and Regional Security 
The Obama administration presented the “pivot”—later dubbed 
the “rebalance” and sometimes described as a “return”—to Asia 
primarily in terms of redefining U.S. priorities and reallocating U.S. 
resources in ways that were more consistent with the U.S.’s national 
interests, which were especially great in then-recently neglected but 
strategically and economically vital East Asia.4 Underlying 
Washington’s shift, and its welcome reception in much of the region, 
was China’s rapid rise in power and China’s actions in pursuit of an 
agenda that appeared, at best, uncertain and, at worst, assertive and 
even aggressive.5 In terms of international security and perhaps more 
generally, the biggest sources of concern about Beijing’s aims and 
behavior were the disputes over territory and related rights in the 
East China Sea (with Japan over the Senkaku / Diaoyu islands and 
adjacent ocean zones) and in the South China Sea (with Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and others over various subsets of four groups 
of islands and rocks, and rights in appurtenant maritime areas).6   
The disputes between China and its neighbors were long-standing 
and they produced significant discord which has led to sporadic 
violent incidents since the 1970s. A relatively long period of relative 
 
4. See, e.g., Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, FP (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/ 
[https://perma.cc/G75E-ZB5D] (“One of the most important tasks of 
American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a 
substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic, strategic, 
and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.”); U.S. Dep’t State, Bureau 
of Public Affairs, The East Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Expanding U.S. 
Engagement (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/218988.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8BGE-ZXMH] (“Recognizing that America’s future 
prosperity and security are intertwined with the East Asia-Pacific 
region, President Barack Obama made a strategic commitment to 
rebalance our efforts and investments toward Asia.”). 
5. See generally, John J. Mearsheimer, Can China Rise Peacefully? NAT’L 
INTEREST (Oct. 25, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-
china-rise-peacefully-10204 [https://perma.cc/FL28-9GCZ]; Aaron L. 
Friedberg, The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? 
30 INT’L SECURITY 7 (2005) (addressing possibility of increasingly 
conflictual relations between China and the United States). 
6. Michael D. Swaine & M. Taylor Fravel, China’s Assertive Behavior, 
Part Two: The Maritime Periphery, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 8, 
(2010), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM35MS.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YF2L-4DFJ]; Alastair Iain Johnston, How New and 
Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?, INT’L SECURITY 15-16 (2013), 
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3704_pp007-048.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B56R-2N2B]. 
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calm came to an end near the beginning of Obama’s presidency, and 
recurrent tensions and occasional crises have roiled regional relations 
since then.7 With China adopting stronger rhetoric, making bolder 
legal claims, and moving to exercise greater physical control over the 
contested areas, regional states—ranging from enduringly close formal 
U.S. allies (such as Japan) to states that had not previously pursued 
security ties with the United States (such as Vietnam), and others in 
between (such as the Philippines and Singapore)—pursued or 
welcomed support from Washington in the face of perceived Chinese 
threats and challenges.8 
Although the pivot was articulated largely in terms of 
geostrategic considerations and somewhat in terms of values, it also 
was cast in legal terms and conjoined with legal arguments. Those 
legal arguments presented the United States as a champion of 
established norms and valuable international public goods—including 
regional stability and, in turn, prosperity.9 Often implicitly, at times 
 
7. See generally, M. TAYLOR FRAVEL, STRONG BORDERS, SECURE NATION: 
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 267-99 
(2008) (discussing China’s attempts to strengthen its claim to offshore 
territory); ALLEN CARLSON, UNIFYING CHINA, INTEGRATING WITH THE 
WORLD: SECURING CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE REFORM ERA 49-
91(2008) (contrasting China’s relatively accommodating stance on land 
border disputes with its more assertive and uncompromising position on 
maritime territorial disputes);  ROBERT D. KAPLAN, ASIA’S CAULDRON: 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE END OF A STABLE PACIFIC 5-50 (2014) 
(discussing China’s rising interest in and capacity to assert  control over 
the South China Sea and implications for friction and conflict in the 
region). 
8. See generally, THE NEW US STRATEGY TOWARDS ASIA: ADAPTING TO 
THE AMERICAN PIVOT (William T. Tow & Douglas Stuart, eds., 2015) 
(providing an overview and examples of generally positive regional 
reactions); ROBERT G. SUTTER ET AL., BALANCING ACTS: THE U.S. 
REBALANCE AND ASIA-PACIFIC STABILITY 19-25 (Aug. 2013), 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pd
f [http://perma.cc/KA6U-2AR3] (discussing the responses of Northeast 
Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Asia-Pacific to the Obama 
administration’s rebalancing of relations).  
9. See, e.g., Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor, Press Release, 
Remarks on The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013 (Mar. 11, 
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisor-
president-united-states-an [http://perma.cc/5688-M95J]( “[T]he U.S. 
rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is also a response to the strong 
demand signal from leaders and publics across the region for … sustained 
attention to regional institutions and defense of international rules and 
norms . . .. The United States is firmly opposed to coercion or the use of 
force to advance territorial claims.  Only peaceful, collaborative and 
diplomatic efforts, consistent with international law, can bring about 
lasting solutions that will serve the interests of all claimants and all 
countries in this vital region.”); John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Remarks on 
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explicitly, and sometimes in response to China’s stated opposition to 
the U.S.’s role, the Obama administration depicted China as the 
party that was violating or undermining existing international legal 
norms.10 U.S. stances on international legal issues relevant to the 
China Seas disputes are part of this pattern. 
The U.S. has long insisted that it takes no official position on the 
question of who has sovereignty over the landforms—and, thus, who 
can claim the limited but valuable rights over adjacent waters and 
continental shelves that a state with territorial sovereignty may enjoy 
under the international law of the sea.11 In the South China Sea 
context, Washington coupled this agnosticism on sovereignty with 
sharp criticism of what the U.S. saw as crisis-risking unilateral 
moves—predominantly by China—to disrupt the status quo, including 
actual control.12 In the East China Sea setting, the U.S.’s position was 
 
U.S.-China Relations (Nov. 4, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/11/233705.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7QKG-5DUQ]) (describing “specific opportunities 
that define the rebalance, goals” which include “reducing tensions and 
promoting regional cooperation by strengthening the institutions and 
reinforcing the norms that contribute to a rules-based, stable region.”); 
Robert D. Kaplan, America’s Pacific Logic, STRATFOR (Apr. 4, 2012, 
8:59 PM), https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/americas-pacific-logic 
[http://perma.cc/A79B-QRNU] (“If American power was diminished, 
China, India and other powers would be far more aggressive toward 
each other than they are now, for they all benefit from the secure sea 
lines of communication provided by the U. S. Navy and Air Force.”). 
10. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks at the University of 
Queensland (Nov. 15, 2014) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/remarks-
president-obama-university-queensland [http://perma.cc/CW47-A6GM]) 
(“[I]f, in fact, China is playing the role of a responsible actor that is 
peaceful and prosperous and stable, that is good for this region, it’s 
good for the world, it’s good for the United States…. [W]e are also 
encouraging China to adhere to the same rules as other nations . . 
.because America will continue to stand up for our interests and 
principles . . ..”). 
11. See e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y State, Remarks With Chinese 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (Sept. 5, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197343.ht
m [https://perma.cc/T2BF-U4CM]) (Clinton, stating, “I reiterated, as I 
have on many occasions, the United States does not take a position on 
competing territorial claims.”). 
12. See, e.g., Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., Statement Before the Senate 
Armed Service Committee on Maritime Security Strategy in the Asia-
Pacific Region 17 (Sept. 17, 2015) (transcript available at 
http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/617677/statem
ent-before-the-senate-armed-service-committee-on-maritime-security-
strate.aspx [http://perma.cc/6XJC-MC5K] (stating that, “The United 
States does not take sides on issues of sovereignty with respect to these 
territorial disputes, but we do insist that all maritime claims be derived 
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more complex and assertive. Although declining to take sides in the 
sovereignty dispute between China and Japan, the U.S. affirmed and 
reaffirmed—including in statements by President Obama and 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—its interpretation of the U.S.-
Japan security treaty as extending the U.S.’s commitments to defend 
the existing arrangement of Japanese administrative control over the 
Senkaku / Diaoyu.13 This posture added another international legal 
dimension, inescapably casting the U.S.’s backing for Japan as an 
interpretation of an internationally lawful mutual security treaty.   
The U.S. standpoint on sovereignty provided a basis for rejecting 
Beijing’s assertions that the U.S. should not attempt to 
“internationalize” the “local” disputes in China’s near seas, or 
“interfere” in a place where the U.S. had no territorial claims.14 It also 
undergirded U.S. moves to convey support for Japan when Chinese 
vessels and aircraft challenged Japan’s hitherto exclusive control over 
 
from naturally-formed land features in accordance with customary 
international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention” and 
that “[i]f one country selectively ignores these rules for its own benefit, 
others will undoubtedly follow, eroding the international legal system 
and destabilizing regional security and the prosperity of all Pacific 
states”); Prashanth Parameswaran, US Not “Neutral” in South China 
Sea Disputes: Top US Diplomat, DIPLOMAT (July 22, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/us-not-neutral-in-south-china-sea-
disputes-top-us-diplomat/ [http://perma.cc/56J9-KYLU] (explaining 
that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel “encouraged all 
actors – not just China – to cease actions that run contrary to [resolving 
disputes], including reclaiming land, building facilities and militarizing 
features”); Kristina Wong, Defense Chief to Beijing: No ‘Militarization’ 
in the South China Sea, HILL (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/271372-carter-warns-china-against-
militarizing-the-south-china-sea [https://perma.cc/DFQ8-DC49]. 
13. Ankit Panda, Obama: Senkakus Covered Under US-Japan Security 
Treaty, DIPLOMAT (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkakus-covered-under-us-
japan-security-treaty/ [http://perma.cc/33XU-FMSG]; Q&A: Japan’s 
Yomiuri Shimbun Interviews President Obama, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/qanda-japans-yomiuri-
shimbun-interviews-president-obama/2014/04/23/d01bb5fc-cae3-11e3-
95f7-7ecdde72d2ea_story.html [http://perma.cc/6V7V-8DB2]; Clinton: 
Senkakus Subject to Security Pact, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 25, 2010), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/09/25/news/clinton-senkakus-
subject-to-security-pact/#.VrT3WzYrKRu [http://perma.cc/QUJ3-
8Y2X]. 
14. Zhang Yi, China Firmly Opposes “US Interference”, CHINA DAILY (June 
1, 2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-
06/01/content_20870993.htm [http://perma.cc/P3FE-PPD9]; Edward 
Wong, Beijing Warns U.S. About South China Sea Disputes, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 22, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23china.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/H4LB-G9QH]. 
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areas near the islands—ostensibly in response to the Japanese 
government’s acquisition (derided in China as “nationalization”) of 
land in the islands owned by private Japanese citizens. When China 
acted, the U.S. sidestepped the sovereignty dispute and even-handedly 
urged all parties to refrain from escalation and the use of force and to 
obey international law, but left no doubt in Tokyo or Beijing about 
Washington’s support for the status quo of Japanese control.15 
The U.S.’s consistent eschewal of a position on territorial 
sovereignty has been conjoined with other law-related positions. 
Under Obama, the U.S. has called broadly on all parties to the South 
and East China Sea disputes to observe international law, and has 
emphasized support for two more specific and fundamental 
international legal principles in the South and East China Sea 
contexts: first, the rival claimants should handle their disputes 
peacefully; and, second, nothing should impede the rights of free 
passage of ships—including the U.S. navy—that the law of the sea 
confers in the high seas, international straits, and waters under the 
(limited) jurisdiction of coastal states.16 Here too, the legal face of 
U.S. policy helped the U.S. to portray itself as the defender of status 
quo norms and as legitimately asserting collective international 
interests against a possible Chinese challenge. It perhaps served also 
to undercut the possible force of a pair of Chinese arguments: that 
China was itself adhering to international law (albeit under a different 
and very controversial view of law’s content, as is discussed below); 
 
15. Justin McCurry & Tania Branigan, Obama Says US Will Defend Japan 
in Island Dispute With China, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama-in-japan-
backs-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china [http://perma.cc/U9F7-
ABBX]; Wu Xinbo, America Should Step Back From the East China 
Sea Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/opinion/america-should-step-
back-from-the-east-china-sea-dispute.html [http://perma.cc/67K2-
YWPF]. 
16. Hillary Clinton, Sec’y State, Discussing U.S.-Vietnam relations, the 
ASEAN Forum, and North Korea in Hanoi, Vietnam (July 23, 2010) 
(transcript available at 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2010/07/201007231
64658su0.4912989.html#axzz3qT0pLkyY [http://perma.cc/6XQ3-
D7ET]); see also Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau E. Asian & 
Pac. Affairs, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Feb. 5, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A9JJ-PU4X]) (stating that U.S. taking “no position” 
on claims to sovereignty over disputed land features coexists with U.S. 
insistence that states forego “intimidation, coercion or force” and that 
“maritime claims must accord with customary international law,” and 
stating that “[i]n support of these principles…the United States 
continues to oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and 
lawful uses of the sea”).  
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and that China had no intention of challenging the free transit of 
ships “in accordance with international law” (while leaving troubling 
ambiguity about whether China saw such restraint as legally 
obligatory rather than discretionary, or as extending to certain 
operations by U.S. military vessels that Beijing has often denounced 
as unlawful).17 
Moves by China and its antagonists—and interpretations of 
Chinese behavior by U.S. observers18—helped the U.S. present its 
positions as legally principled, while also offering U.S. friends and 
allies in the region the strategic support that the Obama 
administration’s pivot promised. Although characterizations of the 
complex pattern of disputes in the South and East China Seas are 
themselves subject to dispute, versions that have gained traction in 
the U.S.—and that have been sharply rejected by China—depict 
China as the more disruptive actor and challenger to the status quo.19 
In these accounts, the principal moments of escalation in the conflict 
between China and the Philippines include: Chinese state ships 
stringing a net across the mouth of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 to 
deny Filipino fishing boats access to the long-disputed area and 
thereafter maintaining patrols to ward off Filipino ships;20 Chinese  
17. Wang Yi on the South China Sea Issue At the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. CHINA (Aug. 6, 2015), available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1287277.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/EPK6-D2Z6]; Sarah Chan, America Stirs Anti-China 
Fears in South China Sea, WORLDMEETS.US (June 24, 2011), 
http://worldmeets.us/globaltimes000069.shtml#axzz3zQ0MwMIK 
[http://perma.cc/GFA3-6M8A]; China urges U.S. not to undermine 
mutual trust, XINHUA (Jan. 30, 2016, 9:56 PM), available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/30/c_135060127.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7F94-LRUH].  
18. See generally Jacques deLisle, Troubled Waters: China’s Claims and the 
South China Sea, 56 ORBIS 608 (2012) (discussing the South China Sea 
and the grounds on which Beijing asserts rights to the disputed areas); 
Peter Dutton, Three Disputes and Three Objectives China and South 
China Sea, 64 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 42, 43-55 (2011) (providing a 
detailed critique of China’s legal claims); James Kraska, The Nine 
Ironies of the South China Sea Mess, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 17, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-nine-ironies-of-the-south-china-sea-
mess/ [http://perma.cc/MSV4-CJHT] (criticizing China’s legal claims as 
unfounded and its behavior as crisis-provoking)). 
19. deLisle, supra note 18; M Taylor Fravel, China’s Island Strategy: 
“Redefine the Status Quo”, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-
status-quo/ [http://perma.cc/SLW3-5VB4]; Kraska, supra note 18 
(stating that “China’s policies have created a dangerous mess in the 
South China Sea”).  
20. Fravel, supra note 19; Jason Miks, China, Philippines in Standoff, 
DIPLOMAT (Apr. 11, 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/china-
philippines-in-standoff/ [http://perma.cc/9UX5-739R]. 
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vessels’ harassment of efforts to resupply the handful of Filipino 
servicemen stationed on the decrepit ship Sierra Madre grounded 
atop a disputed reef;21 China’s refusal to engage in the international 
arbitration proceeding—a venerable peaceful dispute resolution 
process under international law—that the Philippines initiated in 2013 
and pursued in a way that steers clear of the territorial sovereignty 
and  maritime boundary delimitation issues that are outside the scope 
of the tribunal’s jurisdiction (partly because of the limited scope of 
China’s submission to jurisdiction);22 and indications in early 2016 
that China might be preparing to undertake large-scale land-
reclamation at Scarborough Shoal.23 
For the East China Sea, prominent assessments in the U.S. view 
China as having engaged in retaliatory escalation against Japan in 
2012 when it dispatched naval ships, state maritime service vessels, 
and non-state fishing boats to the Senkaku / Diaoyu area after 
Japanese Premier Noda’s government acquired the privately owned 
land on the islands—a move that sought, according to accounts 
sympathetic to Japan, to avoid conflict by preventing purchase, and 
provocative use, of that land by ardent Japanese nationalists, led by 
 
21. Jeff Himmelman, A Game of Shark and Minnows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-
sea/ [http://perma.cc/G464-XLND]; Jane Perlez, Philippines and China 
in Dispute Over Reef, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/world/asia/beijing-and-manila-in-
dispute-over-reef.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/MLK3-KLNB]. 
22. China Rejects Philippines’ Arbitral Request: FM, ENGLISH NEWS: CHINA 
(Feb. 19, 2013, 8:01 PM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/19/c_132178817.htm 
[http://perma.cc/XXW7-B3G4]; China Rejects US Accusations of 
Provoking the Philippines in Maritime Dispute, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST: ASIA (Apr. 1, 2014, 11:16 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1462316/us-accuses-beijing-
provoking-philippines-south-china-sea-dispute?page=all 
[http://perma.cc/PNY2-W53T]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s 
Republic of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea 
Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Dec. 7, 2014), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/R5U2-P778].  
23. David Brunnstrom and Andrea Shalal, EXCLUSIVE-U.S. sees new 
Chinese activity around South China Sea shoal, REUTERS (Mar 18, 2016 
3:42 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-
china-scarborough-update-idUSL2N16Q08M [https://perma.cc/V7BH-
RPU5] (quoting U.S. Navy Chief of Operations Admiral John 
Richardson, “I think we see some surface ship activity [by China near 
Scarborough Shoal, which is] an area of concern…a next possible area of 
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Tokyo Governor Ishihara.24 This narrative of an assertive and status 
quo-threatening China was reinforced by Beijing’s subsequent 
declaration, in November 2013, of an unusually restrictive air defense 
identification zone (ADIZ) over much of the East China Sea, 
including over the Senkaku islands.25   
So too, when China, in 2014, temporarily deployed a massive oil 
exploration rig in waters near Vietnam’s coast and small landforms 
claimed by China, and used water cannons to repel Vietnamese ships, 
the storyline that took hold in the U.S. portrayed China as the 
disturber of the status quo.26 The same pattern recurred, in a much 
 
24. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, DANGEROUS WATERS: CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS ON 
THE ROCKS 12-15, 23 (Apr. 8, 2013), 
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NAT’L INTEREST (Oct. 26, 2014), 
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W3BX] (describing “Chinese decision to confront Japan” over Japan’s 
decision to “nationalize” land in the islands as having “perhaps done 
more to shape the rebalance and the success of its implementation than 
any other actions”).  
25. China Exclusive: Defense Ministry spokesman responds to air defense 
identification zone questions, XINHUA (Nov. 23, 2013), available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132912145.htm 
[https://perma.cc/D3YS-TGDG]; Jun Osawa, China’s ADIZ Over the 
East China Sea: A “Great Wall in the Sky”?, BROOKINGS (Dec. 17, 
2013), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-
defense-identification-zone-osawa [http://perma.cc/2YRN-UDZ7]. 
26. Jen Psaki, State Dep’t Spokesperson, Press Statement on 
Vietnam/China: Chinese Oil Rig Operations Near the Paracel Islands 
(May 7, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225750.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JG3C-Y548]) (characterizing oil rig deployment as 
“provocative” and “part of a broader pattern of Chinese behavior…that 
undermines peace and stability,” and calling on all parties to address 
their claims “peacefully and in accordance with international law”); 
Ankit Panda, China’s HD-981 Oil Rig Returns, Near Disputed South 
China Sea Waters, DIPLOMAT (June 27, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/chinas-hd-981-oil-rig-returns-to-
disputed-south-china-sea-waters/ [http://perma.cc/6CK2-HCCR]; China 
and Vietnam Clash Over Oil Rig in South China Sea as Tensions 
Escalate, WASH. POST (May 7, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-and-
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stronger form after China began, in 2014, to undertake massive land 
reclamation projects at seven landforms and maritime features China 
controls in the South China Sea. U.S. government statements and 
Western media coverage have been highly critical of China’s actions 
and have had little patience with Beijing’s arguments that other 
claimant states had on other occasions undertaken land reclamation 
(although not recently or on so massive a scale), or that the purposes 
of China’s island-building were limited to providing bases for 
maritime rescue, protection for fishing fleets, and other such benign 
purposes.27 
Official statements from the Obama administration and inferences 
from Washington’s support for China’s rivals have entailed or implied 
the U.S.’s rejection of several specific Chinese claims that have been 
inconsistent with legal rules governing maritime rights and related 
security interests or, at least, interpretations of those rules that are 
widely shared internationally and are strongly backed by the United 
States. Although the U.S. has long called on China to clarify the 
nature of the claim associated with its famous “9-dash line” enclosing 
the vast bulk of the South China Sea, the issue sharpened during the 
Obama years.28 China placed renewed emphasis on the 9-dash line—
 
27. Edward Wong & Jonathan Ansfield, To Bolster Its Claims, China 
Plants Islands in Disputed Waters, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/world/asia/spratly-archipelago-
china-trying-to-bolster-its-claims-plants-islands-in-disputed-waters.html 
[http://perma.cc/T3QQ-NFH6]; Daniel Russel, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau 
E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, U.S. Priorities in East Asia and the Pacific 
(Sep. 26, 2014) (transcript available at http://fpc.state.gov/232135.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WCK9-M957]) (stating U.S.’s emphasis on 
“importance of asserting and making and clarifying territorial claims in 
a way that’s fully consistent with accepted international law” and 
noting that “the scale, scope and pace of China’s reclamation work 
vastly exceeds that of others and is the source of clear anxiety and 
instability” in the region); Elizabeth Shim, Ashton Carter: Beijing 
Should End Activities in South China Sea, UPI (Sept. 16, 2015, 1:39 
PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-
News/2015/09/16/Ashton-Carter-Beijing-should-end-activities-in-South-
China-Sea/7451442423816/ [http://perma.cc/UAG5-HXLX]; President 
Obama & President Xi of China, Remarks at a Joint Press Conference 
(Sept. 25, 2015, 12:22 PM) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-
president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint 
[http://perma.cc/58ER-WC6U]) (showing that Obama “conveyed . . . 
significant concerns over land reclamation, construction and the 
militarization of disputed areas.”). 
28. U.S. Department of State Seeks to Clarify Meaning of China’s 9-Dash 
Line, GEOGARAGE BLOG (Feb. 22, 2016), available at 
http://blog.geogarage.com/2016/02/us-department-of-state-seeks-to-
clarify.html [https://perma.cc/4SPM-T2T2] (“Washington has often 
called on Beijing to clarify her claims on the South China Sea, in an 
attempt to constrain them while avoiding a frontal clash”); Scott 
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especially in the context of China’s opposition to claims filed by 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with the United Nations 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf—the international 
body that addresses delimitation of overlapping continental shelf 
zones.29   
When the Obama administration included free international 
passage through the South China Sea among the U.S.’s three 
principal policies on the South China Sea, it implied a challenge to 
the legal validity of the strongest readings of China’s frustratingly 
ambiguous 9-dash line claim.30 The U.S. position was partly rooted in 
the view that China had no plausible legal claim that all the waters 
within the line were Chinese sovereign waters, akin to a territorial 
sea, or that the vast majority of those waters was part of a territorial 
sea ostensibly derived from baselines that—by the standards of U.S. 
and mainstream international views of relevant law—China had 
drawn too expansively around landforms that were too scattered, too 
small, and too unsettled in ownership to support such claims.31  
 
Marciel, Deputy Assistant Sec’y State, Statement Before the Senate 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs (July 15, 2009) 
(transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/07/126076.htm 
[https://perma.cc/G2DH-RMQS]); Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant 
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Asian and Pacific Affairs 9,11 (July 15, 2009) (transcript available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg53022/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg53022.pdf [https://perma.cc/56U6-TWGB]).  
29. See People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations with regard to the joint submission made by 
Malaysia and Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, CML/17/2009 (May 7, 2009); see also People’s 
Republic of China, Note Verbale to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations with regard to the Philippines’ Note Verbale, No. 000228, 
CML/8/2011/ (Apr. 14, 2011); Gabriel Dominguez, China’s Nine-
Dashed Line Has ‘No Basis Under International Law,’ DW (July 27, 
2015), http://www.dw.com/en/chinas-nine-dashed-line-has-no-basis-
under-international-law/a-18609290 [http://perma.cc/BB4N-3PS8] 
(describing Philippines arbitration claim and explaining that, “Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also challenge Chinese claims over most of 
the resource-rich sea.”). 
30. Jeffrey A. Bader, The U.S. and China’s Nine-Dash Line: Ending the 
Ambiguity, BROOKINGS (Feb. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-nine-
dash-line-bader [http://perma.cc/XJA4-PT4U]; Daniel R. Russel, 
Assistant Sec’y, Bureau E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, Testimony before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the 
Pacific (Feb. 5, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm 
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Another of the U.S.’s core policy positions—that disputants 
(especially including China) must adhere to international law—swept 
somewhat more broadly and, again, cast China’s positions as at odds 
with established legal norms. This policy, too, implied rejection of the 
“sovereign waters” claim that China had never definitively repudiated 
despite repeated U.S. calls. It also entailed a rebuff of the less 
radical—but still revisionist—and more recently emerging Chinese line 
of argument that the PRC has “historic rights” or “historic title” over 
the waters that are rooted in customary international law and that 
survived the advent of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS)-centered regime and the contemporary customary 
international law embodied in UNCLOS’s substantive provisions.32 
Amid growing friction over the maritime disputes between 
Washington and Beijing in late 2014, the U.S. State Department’s 
authoritative Limits in the Seas series issued an elaborate analysis 
that rejected the 9-dash line, including China’s “historic” claims the 
area, as unsustainable under international legal rules governing 
maritime zones.33 
The Obama administration’s calls for freedom of navigation (and 
overflight) and adherence to international law framed other Chinese 
legal arguments and actions as at odds with existing principles of 
international law, specifically those concerning the limits of coastal 
states’ rights to regulate activities in their exclusive economic zones 
(EEZ) or on the high seas. The U.S. rejected China’s objections that 
U.S. practices of sending naval vessels and aircraft into areas near 
 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/UHW6-4DVQ] (rejecting Chinese claim to the waters 
in the 9-dash line as inconsistent with international law); Office Ocean 
& Polar Affairs et al., Straight Baselines Claim: China, LIMITS IN SEAS, 
July 9, 1996, at 4-8, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/84SF-NC67] (rejecting China’s straight baseline 
claims in South China Sea as inconsistent with international law); Sam 
LaGrone, U.S. Destroyer Challenges More Chinese South China Sea 
Claims in New Freedom of Navigation Operation, USNI NEWS (Jan. 30, 
2016), https://news.usni.org/2016/01/30/u-s-destroyer-challenges-more-
chinese-south-china-sea-claims-in-new-freedom-of-navigation-operation 
[https://perma.cc/7TLH-SHK7] (describing legal position underlying 
U.S. navigation operation in area where U.S. views Chinese baseline 
claims as excessive).   
32. See Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South 
China Sea: History, Status, and Implications, 107AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 98, 
99 (2013) (arguing that “historic title provides the basis for China’s 
possession of certain historic rights in addition to the rights granted 
under UNCLOS”). 
33. Office Ocean & Polar Affairs et al., China: Maritime Claims in the 
South China Sea, supra note 31, at 15-22 (analyzing and rejecting 9-
dash line claim as “historic” claim under international law). 
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Chinese-claimed landforms were, variously, unauthorized maritime 
scientific research in China’s EEZ, infringement of security rights of 
China in its EEZ, abuse of law-of-the-sea rights—including the 
expansive rights that states enjoy on the high seas—by showing a lack 
of due regard for China’s rights and interests, or non-peaceful uses of 
the sea that threatened China’s sovereign autonomy or territorial 
integrity or contravened other international legal limits.34 Instead, the 
U.S.’s position—consistent with prevalent but contested (by China 
and others) understandings of international legal norms—continued to 
be that close-in surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s EEZ were 
lawful acts, and that the U.S. Navy’s presence and activities in the 
region did not violate international legal rules on peaceful use and 
respect for other states’ rights.35   
Many of these were long-standing points of disagreement that had 
surfaced dramatically in pre-Obama-administration incidents such as 
the collision of a Chinese air force jet with a U.S. Navy surveillance 
plane off the Chinese coast in the early days of the George W. Bush 
administration, and instances of Chinese navy ships harassing U.S. 
surveillance vessels in China’s asserted EEZs.36 But, the Obama-era  
34. Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV. REPORT, Dec. 22, 2015, at 5-6, 11-14, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf. [http://perma.cc/8V83-
EYMD] (describing Chinese positions and the challenges they pose for 
U.S.); Yu Zhirong, Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy’s Military 
Surveys in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Coastal Countries, CHINA 
MAR. STUDY, Dec. 2010, at 38-44, https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---
Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-
Institute/Publications/documents/China-Maritime-Study-7_Military-
Activities-in-the-.pdf [http://perma.cc/B667-ULV7] (explaining and 
supporting Chinese positions and China’s rejection of U.S. positions); 
Peter Dutton, Introduction, CHINA MAR. STUDY, Dec. 2010, at 7-9, 
https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-
Institute/Publications/documents/China-Maritime-Study-7_Military-
Activities-in-the-.pdf [http://perma.cc/B667-ULV7] (describing 
conflicting legal views of U.S. and China). 
35. O’Rourke, supra note 34, at 4, 29-32 (describing U.S. positions on legal 
issues maritime claims, operational rights, and rights to freedom of 
navigation in South China Sea); Dutton, supra note 34, at 7-10 
(describing conflicting U.S. and Chinese legal views and relationship to 
U.S. maritime strategy and patrol activities in the South China Sea). 
36. See generally Eric Donnelly, The United States-China EP-3 Incident: 
Legality and Realpolitik, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC’Y 25 (2004); Spokesman 
Zhu Bangzao Gives Full Account of Collision between U.S. and Chinese 
Military Planes (Apr. 4, 2001), available at http://www.china-
un.ch/eng/premade/11437/spokesman040401.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6ZUY-BEW6]; U.S. Plane Grossly Violated 
International Law, CHINA.ORG.CN (Apr. 4, 2001), available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Apr/10074.htm 
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pivot was accompanied by a reaffirmation of familiar positions and a 
new emphasis on these issues, as well as high-profile confrontations by 
Chinese vessels of U.S. Navy ships, including the USS John McCain 
and the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and the Impeccable again in 2013.37 
Initially framed by the perception that China was generally becoming 
more assertive in the region, the Obama administration’s heightened 
emphasis on freedom of navigation for the U.S. Navy—and others—
became more pointed in response to the specific issue of China’s 
island-building project during the Obama presidency’s final years.   
The land reclamation program prompted more close-in approaches 
by U.S. ships and planes to counter China’s claims of dominion and, 
in turn, stern warnings—based on inchoate and questionable claims of 
legal rights—from Chinese forces to steer clear (including in an 
instance famously recorded by a CNN news team on a fly-along on a 
U.S. military plane).38 In October 2014, the U.S. Navy took a further 
step, sending a destroyer within twelve nautical miles of the recently 
augmented land forms, prompting a new round of Chinese official 
statements that PRC naval ships warned the U.S. ship “according to 
law” and claims that the U.S. was not acting in accordance with 
international law, including obligations not to abuse rights to freedom 
of navigation.39 In January 2016, the U.S. Navy elicited a similar 
response form the PRC when it launched a “freedom of navigation 
operation” within twelve nautical miles of the disputed, PRC-
controlled Paracel Islands—an area in which the U.S. has rejected 
China’s straight baselines and related maritime claims as excessive 
 
37. See generally Raul Pedrozo, Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS 
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(2009); O’Rourke, supra note 34, at 12 (listing U.S.-China incidents at 
sea in last several years). 
38. Jim Sciutto, Behind the Scenes: A Secret Navy Flight over China’s 
Military Build-Up, CNN: POLITICS (May 26, 2015, 8:09 AM), 
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the Poseidon: New Navy Footage Released, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY 
INITIATIVE (May 21, 2015), available at http://amti.csis.org/flight-of-
the-poseidon-new-navy-footage-released/ [http://perma.cc/K5U2-
UAHC]. 
39. Ben Blanchard & Andrea Shalal, Angry China Shadows U.S. Warship 
Near Man-made Islands, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2015, 12:08 AM), available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/28/us-southchinasea-usa-
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Defends Patrols in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015), 
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and inconsistent with international law.40 Implicit in the U.S.’s actions 
and explicit in U.S. statements was an insistence that the U.S. was 
exercising clear rights under established international law of the sea 
and was resisting apparent Chinese efforts to undermine or rewrite 
those rules.   
When China declared its ADIZ over much of the East China Sea 
after the confrontation that followed the Japanese government’s 
acquisition of privately owned land in the Senkaku / Diaoyu, the U.S. 
set forth its criticisms of China’s moves as a defense of status quo 
legal norms.41 Compared to other U.S. critiques of the legality of 
China’s actions in the maritime domain, this was a somewhat 
awkward stance for the U.S., given the lack of a clear and solid 
foundation for ADIZs in international law, and the U.S.’s having 
pioneered the proclamation of ADIZs (and with Japan having 
preceded China in declaring an East China Sea ADIZ).  Nonetheless, 
the Obama administration’s critique—and other U.S. analyses—
notably focused on how China claimed exceptionally broad rights to 
regulate, and potentially to limit, the use of airspace by foreign 
powers—claims of rights that the U.S. would not accept.42 The U.S. 
therefore would not respect the notification requirements for U.S. 
military aircraft that China claimed authority to impose.   
The same dynamic threatened to recur, in a more accentuated 
form, two years later when China responded to the U.S.’s and other 
states’ pushback against Beijing’s island-building with public 
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China Mar. Studies Institute, Testimony before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee: Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the East 
and South China Seas 8 (Jan. 14, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20140114/101612/HHRG-
113-AS28-Wstate-DuttonP-20140114.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUH3-
RR2U]). 
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discussion of a possible Chinese ADIZ over the South China Sea.43 
U.S. assessments tellingly and predictably warned that if China were 
to proclaim an ADIZ over regions so remote from its own substantial 
and undisputed territory, it would portend a more serious breach of—
and challenge to—international norms, including legal ones.44 
Agreements on improved military contacts and incident-avoidance 
reached during Xi Jinping’s September 2015 state visit and before 
may have reduced the risks of accidental incidents and escalation, but 
they did not close the gaps on these legal principles.45 
As the foregoing indicates, while the Obama administration has 
presented the U.S. as a supporter and defender of established 
international legal norms when pursuing its strategic pivot to Asia, 
China has rejected implications or accusations that it is flouting 
international law. The PRC has insisted that its actions are supported 
by law (for example, giving China “indisputable” sovereignty over all 
of the contested landforms and related maritime rights, or “historic” 
rights over contested waters, or rights to limit U.S. navy operations 
 
43. Mira Rapp-Hooper, China’s Short-Term Victory In the South China 
Sea, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-21/chinas-short-
term-victory-south-china-sea [https://perma.cc/X3NN-4ST9]. 
44. Admiral Scott H. Swift, Commander, U.S. Pac. Fleet, Statement as 
delivered at the Royal Australian Navy Seapower Conference 5 (Oct. 6, 
2015) (transcript available at http://www.cpf.navy.mil/leaders/scott-
swift/speeches/2015/10/ran-seapower-conference.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2V78-33ZH]); John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Remarks 
with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (Feb. 23, 2016) (transcript 
available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/02/253164.htm 
[https://perma.cc/P8PD-B6US] (reiterating U.S. commitment to 
freedom of overflight and stressing that enforcement of maritime claims 
by deploying Chinese aircraft over disputed area are “not compatible” 
with that freedom); Li Bao & Si Yang, Experts Worry China May Soon 
Establish South China Sea ADIZ, VOICE  AM. (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.voanews.com/content/experts-concerned-china-may-soon-
establish-southern-adiz/2882795.html [https://perma.cc/ZM5Y-G6DH]. 
See Roncevert Almond, Mandate of Heaven: An ADIZ in the South 
China Sea, DIPLOMAT (July 20, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/mandate-of-heaven-an-adiz-in-the-
south-china-sea/ [https://perma.cc/QHM7-U96H] (“A state’s legal 
ability to administer and use force to secure its sovereign territory and 
accompanying airspace is much broader than the right to self-defense in 
international airspace or within an ADIZ.”). 
45. See Mark J. Valencia, US-China Military Agreements Dodge Deep 
Differences, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/us-china-military-agreements-dodge-
deep-differences/ [https://perma.cc/XV7L-C3K6] (stating, “[w]hether 
these agreements will make such encounters ‘safer’ remains to be seen. 
Meanwhile the root differences remain”). 
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off China’s coast), or do not threaten interests that other states claim 
as legal rights (such as open sea lanes of communications in the South 
China Sea).46   
International law on issues of territorial sovereignty, maritime 
rights, and other matters implicated in the China Seas disputes is in 
some respects ambiguous and potentially unstable. But, overall, the 
U.S. has been able to benefit from and support its pursuit of the goals 
associated with the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia by having 
the better of the argument with China over whose positions are more 
consistent with established rules and interpretations of international 
law. 
For China’s maritime neighbors and rival claimants to the South 
and East China Sea areas, their interests have aligned with the U.S.’s 
strategic pivot and the stance the U.S. has taken on key international 
legal issues during the Obama administration. For those states and 
for the wider region (including China), the U.S.’s security 
commitments and the legal order that those commitments underpin 
have long served as public goods.47 Crucial questions for the post-
pivot and post-Obama years are whether the U.S. will sustain the 
capacity and the will to play its traditional roles in international 
security and related legal regimes in East Asia, and whether a more 
powerful China with more diverse and far-flung interests might 
become more supportive of the status quo or more willing to become a 
provider of international public goods in the region. 
 
46. China’s Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands, 
FOREIGN MIN. CHINA (January 1980); The Issue of the South China Sea, 
FOREIGN MIN. CHINA (June 2000); H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen., 
U.N., Remarks in New York (May 7, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_0
9/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CQG-2DGA]); see 
generally THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
(Stefan Talmon & Bing Bing Jia eds., 2014) (setting forth, in great 
detail, pro-China positions; see Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Views and 
Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, 
CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Spring 2014, at 6 (explaining that 
“authoritative Chinese sources have sought to provide further 
clarifications on the nature and function of the ADIZ, emphasizing the 
conventional and non-threatening nature of the Chinese zone”). 
47. Sheila Smith, The U.S.-Japan Alliance Upgrades and Maritime 
Contention in Asia, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Apr. 30, 
2015), available at http://amti.csis.org/the-u-s-japan-alliance-upgrades-
and-maritime-contention-in-asia/ [https://perma.cc/JP7B-DAK4]; 
James L. Schoff, Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (July 16, 2015), available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/16/strengthening-u.s.-alliances-
in-northeast-asia/idhr [https://perma.cc/9WRK-V2FN]; see also sources 
cited supra note 7. 
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II. The Trans-Pacific Partnership—Integration and 
Rivalry in the East Asian and Global Economy 
Among the impetuses to the U.S.’s pursuit of the TPP was that 
the TPP would serve as the economic leg of the Obama 
administration’s pivot, or rebalance, to Asia.48 With its origins in 
proposals that predated the Obama administration, and after 
protracted negotiations that spanned the first several years of 
Obama’s presidency, the TPP final agreement was reached by the 
U.S. and eleven other states (including Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam) 
on October 5, 2015 and signed by the U.S. on February 3, 2016.49 The 
pact is massive; its charter members engage in one-third of world 
trade and produce 40% of global GDP.50 It is also ambitious, with 
provisions addressing traditional trade issues, international 
investment, intellectual property, currency policy, and many aspects 
of domestic economic regulation, including labor rights and 
environmental protection.51  With its original and likely expanding 
 
48. Jeffrey A. Bader & David Dollar, Why the TPP is the Linchpin of the 
Asia Rebalance, BROOKINGS (July 28, 2015, 8:00 AM), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/07/28-
tpp-linchpin-asia-rebalance-bader-dollar [https://perma.cc/D8RT-
HKXP];  Ankit Panda, Forging the Trans-Pacific Partnership: An 
Insider’s Take, DIPLOMAT (June 10, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/forging-the-trans-pacific-partnership-
an-insiders-take/ [https://perma.cc/KL39-UY6F]; Mireya Solis, The 
Geopolitical Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, BROOKINGS 
(Mar. 13, 2015, 12:25 PM), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/03/13-
geopolitical-importance-transpacific-partnership 
[https://perma.cc/JB9L-J2VG]; Bernard K. Gordon, The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and the Rise of China: What Japan Joining the TPP Means 
for the Region, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 7, 2011), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2011-11-07/trans-
pacific-partnership-and-rise-china [https://perma.cc/NH3U-4D3A].  
49. See President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (Oct. 5, 2015) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-
president-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/8C99-QG6R]; 
Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 3, 2016), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/03/statement-
president-signing-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/USF3-
6AMV]). 
50. Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, OFF. U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at https://ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-
US-objectives [https://perma.cc/CD7F-VYNV]. 
51. See generally Peter A. Petri et al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership and 
Asia-Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment, E.-WEST CTR. 
WORKING PAPERS: ECON. SERIES, Oct. 24, 2011, 8-9, 14-21 (discussing 
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membership in East Asia, the TPP promises to link the U.S. more 
closely to major economies in the region and thereby strengthen the 
U.S.’s economic presence and interests in the part of the world that 
Obama-era policies have identified as singularly important to the 
U.S.’s international interests, economic as well as geostrategic.   
Along with earlier-established free-trade agreements with Korea 
and Singapore, the TPP provides an economic dimension to 
rebalancing that has offered reassurance to the U.S.’s allies and 
partners and others in the region that Washington’s security 
commitments are durable.52 Absent a robust economic component, the 
more prominent security side of the pivot would risk looking like a 
“sucker’s bet” for the U.S.—and one that regional states could not 
count on the U.S. making over the long run. That is, the United 
States would be bearing the considerable costs of underwriting 
regional security, and it would be doing so with diminished resources 
and perhaps weakened will in the post-Iraq War and post-Global 
Financial Crisis era. Without the TPP and other arrangements to 
bolster economic ties between the U.S. and regional states, China 
would reap a more rapidly growing share of the economic benefits of 
East Asian stability and integration as the increasingly preeminent 
trade partner and fast-rising investment partner for most states in the 
region. TPP-deepened and TPP-strengthened economic ties between 
the U.S. and regional states promised to exert some counterforce to 
China’s economic gravitational pull, and to bind the U.S. and East 
Asian states to the mast in their commitments to one another by 
giving them economic reasons to support the status quo in the region, 
including the U.S. security commitments that, while offensive to 
China, underpin that status quo. 
As this suggests, the TPP, and the economic face of the pivot 
more generally, also have responded to China’s rise as an economic 
power. That rise has been accompanied—and aided and reflected—by 
major regional trade agreement initiatives, including the ASEAN-
China Free Trade Agreement, the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (and numerous follow-on accords), the pursuit 
of free trade agreements with Korea and Japan, and a Regional 
Cooperative Economic Partnership (RCEP) that will include several 
 
TPP objectives and  providing an inventory of issues covered); JEFFREY 
J. SCHOTT, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
11-40 (2013) (discussing the TPP scope, and negotiations and their 
implications). 
52. Jane Perlez, U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on 
China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015) [hereinafter U.S. Allies], 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-
partnership-china-australia.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9SZX-X3AM]; 
Solis, supra note 48. 
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TPP members and rival the TPP in scale.53 China’s initiatives in the 
2010s have gone beyond those centered on trade agreements. Beijing 
increasingly has sought to take a leading role in establishing new 
regional institutions with functions similar to those of the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development 
Bank. Prominent among these are the Shanghai-based Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS-linked New 
Development Bank (NDB), and an International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)-like lending facility.54  
In the TPP and related contexts, the Obama administration 
framed its agenda partly in legal terms and sought to depict its 
positions as supporting or fostering core legal—and broader—status 
quo norms for the international economy.55 The TPP, after all, will be 
a legally binding international agreement that sets forth legal rules, 
many of which build on commitments member states have made in 
earlier trade agreements concerning their domestic laws governing 
foreign trade and investment. In pressing for the TPP, as with the 
security dimension of the pivot, the Obama administration asserted or 
implied contrasts between its generally status quo-supporting 
approach and China’s agenda and behavior.   
Yet, the Obama administration’s claim to be defending the legal 
status quo has been on shakier ground with respect to the TPP and 
East Asian regional economic institutions than in the context of the 
issues related to international security in the South and East China 
Seas. In the areas addressed by the TPP, the relevant international 
legal norms and rules became unsettled before and during the Obama 
administration, and some of the goals that U.S. policy pursued were 
 
53. See generally FTA News Release, CHINA FTA NETWORK, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/LR74-
CY8Z] (supplying news releases discussing various updates and details 
regarding the trade agreements); Give Play to China’s Important Role 
and Accelerate RCEP Negotiations, MINISTRY COM. CHINA (Sept. 1, 
2014, 1:09 PM), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/20140
9/20140900720384.shtml [https://perma.cc/6NWC-PWPC] (providing 
additional information about the trade agreements and the RCEP). 
54. The significance of these institutional developments is discussed in 
greater detail later in this article. 
55. See, e.g., Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFF. 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 2015), available at 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership  
[https://perma.cc/GS84-VS7T] (summarizing content of TPP’s 30 
chapters,  covering a wide range of trade-related legal issues and 
mandating conforming legal rules and characterizing the TPP as, in 
part, “updating traditional approaches to areas covered by previous free 
trade agreements”). 
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not clearly or securely among the values or principles embedded in 
existing laws and related institutions. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) became the centerpiece of 
the international economic legal regime beginning in the early 1990s, 
when it succeeded—and extended into areas well beyond trade in 
manufactured goods—the original General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, which had been the most significant (although institutionally 
weak) component of the postwar legal order for the international 
economy. The WTO was not, however, a significant feature in the 
Obama administration’s quest for the TPP. This was largely due to 
the WTO’s stark decline, following the collapse of the Doha Round 
negotiations, as the locus for liberalizing international trade, and the 
WTO’s limitations in addressing many of the other international 
economic issues—such as intellectual property rights, investment 
regulation, and labor and environmental standards—that were on the 
U.S.’s agenda for the TPP.56 
From early in the TPP negotiating process, it was relatively clear 
that the agreement would in some fundamental respects seek to 
further the values and extend the rules that were already embodied in 
the WTO and the WTO-centered regime for international economic 
law.57 It is at least plausible to claim that this is the case with respect 
to further liberalizing trade in manufactured goods and agricultural 
products, enhancing market access, extending trade-facilitating rules 
more deeply into service sectors and the digital economy, improving 
transparency of trade-limiting rules and procedures, coordinating 
competition laws, limiting non-market behavior by state enterprises, 
reducing barriers to foreign investment (in part by adopting a 
“negative list” approach that provides for openness except in sectors 
specifically identified in host-country law), offering procedural 
protections for foreign investors (including dispute settlement through 
international arbitration) that should encourage international 
investment, providing robust protection for intellectual property, and 
restricting problematic domestic practices (including lax restrictions 
on pollution or protection of workers’ rights) that can confer arguably 
 
56. Bryan Mercurio, The WTO and Its Institutional Impediments, 8 MELB. 
J. INT’L. L. 198, 200-06 (2007); David Francis, The U.S.-Asia Trade 
Deal Puts Dysfunction at the WTO on Full Display, FP: CABLE (Oct. 7, 
2015, 1:59 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/the-u-s-asia-
trade-deal-puts-dysfunction-at-the-wto-on-full-display/ 
[https://perma.cc/K66G-A9PS]. 
57. Much of the specific content of the TPP had remained unknown until 
late in the process because of the secrecy of the negotiating process and 
repeated delays in reaching a final agreement. Nonetheless, numerous 
leaks hand revealed many of the key elements early on, and the final 
text largely confirmed expectations.   
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unfair competitive advantages.58 Such features have underpinned the 
Obama administration’s claim that the TPP is a “twenty-first 
century” trade agreement and that the TPP would give the U.S. a 
leading role in writing the rules for the international economy for the 
century ahead, much as the U.S. had shaped the economic and legal-
economic regimes for the postwar world.59 
But, as such forward-looking rhetoric implicitly concedes, writing 
new rules—even rules that are generally consistent with the principles 
or values embodied in existing rules—is not the same thing as 
defending or supporting the status quo legal order. The TPP is in 
tension with the WTO’s core “most favored nation” principle (of 
equal treatment for all WTO member trading partners). In this 
respect, however, the TPP does not depart from the status quo. The 
WTO’s aspiration for universal rules has long given way to extensive 
use—and not infrequent abuse—of provisions that allow preferential 
trade agreements among groups of WTO members.60  
Many of the TPP terms that have been most divisive 
internationally and in the U.S. are controversial in part because they 
depart from existing international economic legal rules, including ones 
with roots in the WTO.  For example, the Obama administration’s 
drive for stronger protection for intellectual property rights has been a 
distinctively (if not uniquely) American aim, resisted by other parties 
 
58. See generally, TPP Full Text, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text 
[https://perma.cc/X42L-G28Z] (providing the provisions of the TPP in 
full). 
59. Barack Obama, My Turn: Trans-Pacific Partnership is Better than Past 
Trade Deals, POL. MONITOR (Oct. 17, 2015), 
https://politics.concordmonitor.com/2015/10/opinion/my-turn-trans-
pacific-partnership-is-better-than-past-trade-deals/ [perma.cc/6D9A-
M7PH]; Jeffrey Zients, Bringing Trade Agreements into the 21st 
Century,  WHITE HOUSE (APR. 16, 2015, 6:20 PM), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/04/16/bringing-trade-
agreements-21st-century [https://perma.cc/Z6UT-EMLA]; Barack 
Obama, Here’s the Deal: The Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
MEDIUM (Nov. 5, 2013), https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-
partnership/here-s-the-deal-the-text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership-
103adc324500#.klt37ir24 [https://perma.cc/NV9W-UZQF]. 
60. See generally, Regionalism: Friends or Rivals?, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey1_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5UK4-PNQU] (discussing the developments of the 
regional trade groups); Sydney M. Cone, III, The Promotion of Free-
Trade Areas Viewed in Terms of Moat-Favored-Nation Treatment and 
“Imperial Preference”, 26 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 563, 563 (2005) (examining 
the creation of free-trade areas and their “exceptions to the basic WTO 
principle of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment”). 
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and potential parties to trade agreements.61 So too, Obama 
administration-supported TPP provisions—specifically, the Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) process—that would allow 
international arbitral bodies to hear challenges to a state’s legal rules 
have drawn fire from the left (for favoring multinational companies) 
and from the left and right (for undermining American sovereignty by 
subjecting U.S. laws to challenge in non-U.S. tribunals).62  Much the 
same can be said about the long-incompletely-disclosed and highly 
contentious sections concerning environmental63 and labor rights64 
 
61. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime-Shifting: The TRIPS 
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking, 29 YALE INT’L L. J. 1, 1-2, 23-25 (2004) (discussing growing 
“[c]hallenges to existing methods of international intellectual property 
lawmaking” and developing country concerns with U.S. and European 
Community agendas); Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an 
Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. R. 105, 109-18 (2012) (noting the 
concerns raised regarding intellectual property provisions by the secrecy 
of the TPP negotiating text and setting TPP against the back drop of 
prior international opposition to U.S.-led efforts to expand intellectual 
property protection under TRIPS). 
62. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone 
Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb, 25, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-
language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-
11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/38TV-SU3C]; 
Celeste Drake, TPP Daily Debunk #1: The ‘Most Progressive Trade 
Agreement Ever,’ AFL-CIO NOW (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Political-Action-Legislation/TPP-Daily-
Debunk-1-The-Most-Progressive-Trade-Agreement-Ever 
[https://perma.cc/QVR5-X8CH]; Alan Morrison, Is the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Unconstitutional?, ATLANTIC (June 23, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/tpp-isds-
constitution/396389/ [https://perma.cc/TV9E-J976]; Daniel J. Ikenson, 
A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, CATO INSTITUTE (Mar. 4, 2014), 
available at http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-
bulletin/compromise-advance-trade-agenda-purge-negotiations-investor-
state, [https://perma.cc/4BRD-METM]; William Mauldin, Dispute-
Resolution System Fuels Criticism of Pacific Trade Pact, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 2, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dispute-
resolution-system-fuels-criticism-of-pacific-trade-pact-1425330853 
[https://perma.cc/V88P-W2ND]; see also Sessions on TPP: ‘My Fears 
Confirmed’; Shut Off Fast-Track Now, JEFF SESSIONS SENATE WEBPAGE 
(Nov. 5, 2015),  http://www.sessions.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-
releases?ID=711D14A5-8B65-4E4B-AAE1-7DCAA93EE60B 
[https://perma.cc/U3HV-9D54](stating that the TPP “puts those who 
make the rules out of reach of those who live under them, empowering 
unelected regulators” from other countries). 
63. Michael Brune, Congress Should Oppose the TPP on Environmental 
Grounds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015, 7:58 AM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/10/06/the-future-of-
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protection, with U.S. critics on the left worried that new international 
legal rules will offer standards or enforcement mechanisms that are 
too weak, and U.S. critics on the right concerned that the Obama 
administration might use TPP commitments to increase regulatory 
burdens and costs for U.S. industry. On both sides, the concern is not 
about international legal stasis but about international legal change. 
Along with this mix of status quo-supporting, norm-extending, 
and rule-revising aims, the Obama administration’s pursuit of the 
TPP, including its distinctly legal elements, has entailed rivalry with 
China and has included efforts to portray China’s aims as in tension 
with existing or evolving international legal norms.65 When the U.S. 
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Partnership Deserves a Hearing, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 20, 2015 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/417161/trans-pacific-
partnership-deserves-hearing-editors [https://perma.cc/784U-H968]; The 
United States and Environmental Protections in the TPP, TRADEWINDS 
(Jan. 2014), available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/blog/2014/January/The-US-and-Environmental-Protections-in-
the-TPP [https://perma.cc/H3BM-HPST]. 
64. Trans-Pacific Partnership: Labor Rights, AFL-CIO, available at 
http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Trade/Trans-Pacific-Partnership-Free-
Trade-Agreement-TPP [https://perma.cc/76ZV-GZMH];  John Nichols, 
Why So Many Democrats Rejected Obama’s Lobbying on the Trans-
Pacific Trade Deal, NATION (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/why-so-many-democrats-rejected-
obamas-lobbying-trans-pacific-trade-deal/ [https://perma.cc/6VXX-
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TPP, UNITED AUTO WORKERS (Dec. 3, 2015), available at 
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[https://perma.cc/JQ24-T9CG] (explaining that President Obama 
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began to pursue the TPP in earnest under Obama, PRC observers 
characterized it—not without reason—as an “ABC” (“anyone but 
China”) pact.66 In its drive for congressional support for the “fast 
track” trade promotion authority (TPA) that long has been essential 
for U.S. presidents to achieve trade agreements, the Obama 
administration strikingly emphasized rivalry with China, specifically 
in terms of assuring that the U.S., not China, will “write the rules” 
for the Asian and global economies.67 Even with TPA and a freshly 
completed TPP agreement in hand (but still facing opposition in 
Congress in a future up-or-down vote on the pact), Obama reprised 
this theme, declaring the TPP essential to avoiding an outcome in 
which “competitors that don’t share our values, like China, will write 
the rules for the global economy.”68 The President reiterated this 
 
“warn[ed] China that it must ‘play by the rules’ as its international 
influence increases”). 
66. See, e.g., Guoyu Song & Wen Jin Yuan, China’s Free Trade Agreement 
Strategies, WASH. Q., Fall 2012, at 110 (explaining that, “most Chinese 
scholars claim its successful implementation will have a negative impact 
on China”); Mei Xinyu, TPP No Better than ‘Imperial Preference’, 
CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 2015, 7:34 PM), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-
10/12/content_22159826.htm [https://perma.cc/JQ24-T9CG] (“Be it 
launching the negotiations on the TPP, or reaching agreement on the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe, all the 
US’ moves have the intention of maintaining its hegemony in 
international trade rulemaking while excluding China.”); Elizabeth 
Shim, China’s Exclusion from Trans-Pacific Partnership Provokes 
Reactions, UPI, (Oct. 6, 2015, 1:29 PM), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/10/06/Chinas-
exclusion-from-Trans-Pacific-Partnership-provokes-
reactions/7151444150517/ [https://perma.cc/UT7W-8MUM] (“China’s 
exclusion from the finalized Trans-Pacific Partnership has provoked a 
range of responses from the world’s second-largest economy, and an 
analyst said the deal is driven by political motivations to encircle 
China.”). 
67. See Tanya Somander, President Obama: “Writing the Rules for 21st 
Century Trade”, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 18, 2015, 3:01 PM), available at  
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point, nearly verbatim, in his final State of the Union address and in 
his statement on signing the TPP.69 
The Obama administration often moderated its tone concerning 
China and the TPP, declaring that the TPP was open to all who 
could satisfy its relatively exacting standards—something that China 
was far from achieving.70 China softened its position as well, 
indicating that it was potentially interested in eventual accession.71 
Even amid such less confrontational stances, however, the 
international law-related point remained the same: the TPP was a 
demanding treaty that was a qualitative step forward for established 
international norms of trade liberalization, and that remained beyond 
China’s capacity and will. U.S. official and mainstream sources 
contrasted the TPP as a “high quality” trade-plus accord with the 
China-centered RCEP, which limited itself more narrowly to trade 
issues, imposed weaker overall obligations, and permitted greater 
variance among the obligations of members. Such traits were familiar 
from the much-criticized “spaghetti bowl” or “noodle bowl” of 
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available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-
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overlapping and diverse trade pacts that were prevalent in Southeast 
Asia. 72   
The Obama administration’s partly self-proclaimed competition 
with China over the legal and law-related institutions of the 
international economy, and its efforts to present the U.S. as 
supporting established law or the further development of the legal 
norms embodied in the existing order, extends beyond trade pacts. 
The Obama administration, along with like-minded critics, cast the 
AIIB and other new PRC-backed international institutions as 
potential threats to venerable organs of the international economic-
legal order, including the World Bank and the IMF.73 The Obama 
administration strove, with strikingly little success, to dissuade U.S. 
friends and allies from joining the AIIB.74 A rare exception to the 
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pattern of Washington’s failure was Japan, which has been a pivotal 
member of the Asian Development Bank—the entity perhaps most 
immediately in potential competition with the AIIB.  
Although political and economic calculations do much to explain 
the rush by many states in East Asia and the developed world to join 
the AIIB and to reject Washington’s entreaties, the Obama 
administration’s inability to claim credibly that it was defending a 
robust status quo in international economic law did not help the 
U.S.’s case. Beijing strongly insisted that it was not challenging status 
quo norms. The PRC explained that it was offering the AIIB and 
other institutional initiatives as supplements to existing entities, not 
as substitutes for them or competitors to them. Chinese sources 
explained that much of the lending from the new bodies would be 
based on the standards established by existing institutions under rules 
already in place.75 In a particularly sharp poke at the U.S.’s case, 
Beijing asserted that its moves were made necessary by the failure—
largely attributable to the U.S.’s congressionally-induced inability to 
move forward—to reform the IMF and the World Bank to realign 
those institutions with new realities.76 Those realities principally 
included the greatly increased economic importance of China, India, 
and other large emerging economies, and the greatly increased need to 
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AIIB “will be observing international rules” and is “ready to carry out 
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Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Address at AIIB 
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(stating that the AIIB would be “a truly international, rule-based and 
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mobilize much greater resources if the World Bank and IMF were to 
perform their functions adequately in a global economy with vast 
infrastructure needs and many countries at risk for balance of 
payment difficulties.77   
So too, China has been able to parry U.S. critiques of China’s 
international economic and legal-economic initiatives, thanks in part 
to the Obama administration’s resort to China-excluding rhetoric 
when it was cultivating domestic support for the TPP.78 China’s 
case—and rebuttal of the U.S.’s case—also benefited from Beijing’s 
ability to present the RCEP, in comparison to the TPP, as an equally 
lawful and not innately rivalrous regional economic agreement that 
advances (albeit somewhat modestly) widely accepted international 
norms of trade liberalization and international economic integration.79 
The interests and preferences of East Asian states (most of which 
are members or potential members of the TPP, the RCEP, or both) 
have generated complex and ambivalent stances toward the Obama 
administration’s agenda on regional economic issues and their legal 
aspects. Many states in the region have reacted positively.  They have 
endorsed parts of the U.S.’s agenda. They have pursued the TPP as a 
legal framework for promoting trade, investment and economic 
integration. They have welcomed the opportunity to balance their 
growing economic dependence on China with more ties to the United 
States. They have taken comfort in the U.S.’s signal of an economic 
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commitment to complement and reinforce its security commitment to 
the region.80 Yet, these states have not wanted closer economic and 
related legal ties with the United States to undermine their economic 
relations with China, which have offered considerable benefits as well, 
and which could be expected to grow with China’s continued 
economic rise and the new opportunities offered by China’s RCEP, 
AIIB, and other economic initiatives and associated legal frameworks 
and institutional structures.   
As the Obama years near their end, fundamental questions 
remain unanswered. They include the prospects for congressional 
passage of—and public reaction to—the just-completed and still-
controversial TPP.81 Assuming Congress eventually approves the TPP 
(and even if it does not), U.S. policy in the post-Obama period will 
have to grapple with uncertainty about where along the spectrum 
from complementarity to systemic conflict will lie the relationships 
between the TPP and long-standing institutions such the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the ADB, on one side, and the RCEP, and other 
emerging, more Chinese-influenced entities such as the AIIB and the 
NDB, as well as China’s “one belt, one road” policy (for developing 
overland and maritime transportation infrastructure to link China 
southward and westward all the way to Europe), on the other. 
III. After Obama and under a ‘New Normal’? 
As the Obama administration enters its final months, many of the 
unanswered questions about the legacy of the pivot—including the 
response to still-evolving security challenges in the South and East 
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opposition from leaders of the Republican majority in Congress and 
from the major presidential candidates. Alexander Bolton & Vicki 
Needham, GOP in no hurry to move Obama’s TPP, HILL (Jan. 6, 2016), 
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China Seas, the unfinished and beleaguered quest for the TPP, and 
the legal dimensions of those policy agendas—reflect the uncertainties 
of long-term trends in the relative capacities and evolving preferences 
of the United States, China, and other states in East Asia.   
Among the factors now contributing to the uncertainty is the 
possibility that the recent troubles in the Chinese economy reflect 
problems that will be serious and lasting and that may have 
significant political consequences. It may be that slowing growth 
rates, a tumultuous stock market, a sharply fluctuating currency, and 
government policy measures that have appeared to be less effective 
than in the past will be more than transient or manageable problems. 
If that is the case and China falls well short of the lowered 
expectations of a “new normal” of 7% to 7.5% growth—or the further 
lowered target of 6.5% growth to be adopted in the 13th Five Year 
Plan82—or faces internal weakness and instability, then a fundamental 
underpinning for the pivot and its legal component—the challenge of 
an inexorably and rapidly rising China—will be called into question. 
If so, and, along with it, the Obama-era policies and related legal 
tactics that have responded to China’s rapid rise will need to be 
reconsidered.   
Another near-term event with potentially long-term consequences 
is the presidential election in the United States that will bring 
Obama’s successor to power in January 2017. Especially in China, 
Democratic Party frontrunner Hillary Clinton is widely seen as likely 
to be tougher on China than Obama was.83 Accurate or not, this 
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expectation is based in part on her central role as Secretary of State 
in articulating the pivot policy, including its security-related 
international legal components. On the Republican side, contenders 
for the nomination seem to be reprising a U.S. presidential campaign 
tradition of the out-of-power party criticizing the incumbent party for 
being too soft on China. The leading GOP hopefuls for 2016 seem to 
be doing this in especially strong forms.84 
Possible changes in policy toward China are only part of the issue 
for the post-Obama prospects for the pivot and its legal sequelae. 
Changes in presidents can also bring changes in U.S. views on the 
importance and roles of international law. The Obama administration 
placed significantly greater emphasis on international law and 
presenting its foreign policy actions as conforming to international 
legal norms and rules than did the Bush administration. As we have 
seen, portraying the pivot in terms that emphasized or asserted the 
U.S. agenda’s consistency with the international legal status quo 
arguably served the U.S.’s aims and interests during the Obama 
years. The next American president may, or may not, have a 
significantly different perspective. The challenges he or she faces in 
the East Asian region and the wider world may, or may not, be ones 
for which U.S. claims to support or advance established international 
legal principles and values will dovetail with U.S. interests and 
administration policy. 
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